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WILLIAM A.. DRENNA.N, Respondent, v. STAR P A. VING 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Estoppel-Promissory EstoppeL-A. promise which the prom-
isor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
of a definite and substantial character on the part of the 
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance 
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise. " 
[2] Id.-Promissory Estoppel.-A paving company's oirer to do 
certain paving work according to a bid it submitted to a 
general contractor constituted a promise to perform on such 
conditions as were stated expressly or by implication therein 
or annexed thereto by operation of law, and where it had 
[1J See Cal.Jur.2d, Estoppel, § 7. 
McE:. Dig. References: [1-8] Estoppel, § 20; [9] Damages, § 29; 
{10] Pleading, § 279. 
'10 DRENNAN 11. STAB PAVING Co. [51 C.2d 
reason to bclieve that if its bid proved the lowest it would be 
used by the general contractor, it induced "action ••• of a 
definitc and substantial charactcr on thc part of the promisee" 
so as to be binding within the rule of promi!<sory estoppel. 
[3] Id.-Promissory Estoppel.-Whether implied in fact or law, a 
subsidiary promise not to revoke an offer for a bilateral con-
tract serves to preclude the injustice that would result if the 
offer could be revoked after the offeree acted in detrimental 
reliance thel'eon. Reasonable reliance resulting in a forsee-
able prejudicial change in position affords a compelling basis 
for implying the subsidiary promise not to revoke. 
[4] Id.-Promisso17 Estoppel.-The absence of consideration is 
not fatal to the enforcement of a subsidiary promise not to 
revoke an offer for a bilateral contract. The very purpose 
of a promissory estoppel is to make a promise binding though 
there is no consideration in the sense of something bargained 
for and given in exchange; reasonable reliance serves to hold 
the offeror in lieu of the consideration ordinarily required to 
make the offer binding. 
[6] ld.-Promissory Estoppel.-When a general contractor used 
a paving company's offer to do certain paving work according 
to a bid in computing his own bid, he bound himself to 
perform in reliance on the paving company's terms, and 
though it did not bargain for this use of its bid, it is reason-
able to suppose that it submitted its bid to obtain the pav-
ing subcontract, and it was bound to realize the substantial 
possibility that its bid would be the lowest and that it would 
be included by the general contractor in his bid; since it 
was to its own interest that the contractor be awarded the 
general contract, and since the contractor would be bound by 
his own bid, it is only fair that thc contractor should have at 
least an opportunity to accept the paving company's bid after 
the general contract has been awarded him. 
[6] ld.-Promissory Estoppel.-A general contractor is not free 
to delay acceptance of a subcontractor's offer after he has been 
awarded the general contract in the hope of getting a better 
price, and he cannot reopen bargaining with the subcontractor 
and at the same time claim a continuing right to accept the 
original offer. 
[7] ld.-Promissory Estoppel.-If a general contractor had reason 
to believe that a paving company's bid for a subcontract was 
in error he could not justifiably rely on it and the rule of 
promissory estoppel would afford no basis for enforcing it, 
but where he had no reason to know that the paving company 
had made a mistake in submitting its bill and he ('olllmitted 
himself to perfonning the nlain cont1'lIct in reliance on the 
paving company's figure, such mistake, far from relieving 
the paving company of its obligation, constituted an additional 
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r~llson for enforcing it, since it misled the general eontrartor 
as to the cost of doing the paving. 
[8] Id.-Promissory Estoppel.-As between a subcontractor who 
made a bid for paving work and the general contractor who 
reasonnbly relied on it, the loss resulting from a mistake in 
submitting the hid sllOuld fall on the party who caused it. 
[9] Damages-Mitigation and Reduction of Loss.-In an action to 
recover damages caused by defendant's refusal to perform 
certain paving work according' to a bid it submitted to plain-
tiff, plaintiff acted reasonably to mitigate damages where his 
uncontradicted evidence sllowed that he spent several months 
trying to get bids from other subcontractors and took the 
lowest bid. 
[10] Pleading-Waiver-Grounds of Special Demurrer.-Where 
any uncertainty in plaintiff's allegation as to damages could 
ltave been raised by special demurrer (Code Civ. Proc., § 430, 
subd. 9), but was not so raised, it was waived. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern 
County. William L. Bradshaw, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for refusal to perform certain paving 
work according to a bid submitted to plaintiff as general con-
tractor. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Atus P. Reuther, Norman Soibelman, Obegi & High and 
Earl J. McDowell for Appellant. 
S. B. Gill for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment for 
plaintiff in an action to recover damages caused by defendant's 
refusal to perform certain paving work according to a bid it 
submitted to plaintiff. 
On July 28,1955, plaintiff, a licensed general contractor, was 
preparing a bid on the "Monte Vista School Job" in the 
Lancaster school district. Bids had to be submitted before 
8 p. m. Plaintiff testified that it was customary in that area 
for general contractors to receive the bids of subcontractors 
by telephone on the day set for bidding and to rely on them 
in computing their own bids. Thus on that day plaintiff's 
secretary, Mrs. Johnson, received by telephone between 50 and 
75 subcontractors' bids for various parts of the school job. As 
each bid came in, she wrote it on a spedal form, which she 
[9) See Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 111; Am.Jur., Damages, § 190 . 
. " 
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brought into plaintiff's office. He then posted it on a master 
cost sheet setting forth the names and bids of all subcontrac-
tors. His own bid had to include the names of subcontractors 
who were to perform one-half of one per cent or more of the . 
construction work, and he had also to provide a bidder's bond I 
of 10 per cent of his total bid of $317,385 as a guarantee that I 
he would enter the contract if awarded the work. 
Late in the afternoon, Mrs. Johnson had a telcphone con-
versation with Kenneth R. HOOll, an estimator for defendant. 
He gave his name and telephone number and stated that he 
was bidding for defendant for the paving work at the Monte 
Vista School according to plans and specifications and that 
his bid was $7,131.60. At Mrs. Johnson's request he repeated 
his bid. Plaintiff listened to the bid over an extension tele-
phone in his office and posted it on the master sheet after 
receiving the bid form from Mrs. Johnson. Defendant's was 
the lowest bid for the paving. Plaintiff computed his own bid 
accordingly and submitted it with the name of defendant as 
the subcontractor for the paving. When the bids were opened 
on July 28th, plaintiff's proved to be the lowest, and he was 
awarded the contract. 
On his way to Los Angeles the next morning plaintiff 
stopped at defendant's office. The first person be met was 
defendant's construction engineer, Mr. Oppenheimer. Plaintiff 
testified: "I introduced myself and he immediately told me 
that they bad made a mistake in their bid to me the night 
before, they couldn't do it for the price they had bid, and I 
told him I would expect him to carry through with their 
original bid because I had used it in compi1in~ my bid and 
the job was being awarded them. And I would have to go and 
do the job according to my bid and I would expect them to do 
the same." 
Defendant refused to do the paving work for less than 
$15,000. Plaintiff testified that be "got figures from other 
people" and after trying for several months to get as Iowa 
bid as possible engaged L & H Paving Company, a firm in 
Lancaster, to do the work for $10,948.60. 
The trial court found on substantial evidence that defendant 
made a definite offer to do the paving on the Monte Vista job 
according to the plans and specifications for $7,131.60, and 
that plaintiff relied on defendant '8 bid in computing his own 
bid for the school job and naming dcfendant therein as the 
subcontractor for the paving work. Accordingly, it entered 
judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $3,817 (the differ-
) 
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ence between defendant's bid and the cost of the paving to 
plaintiff) plus costs. 
Defendant contends that there was no enforceable contraet 
between the parties on the ground that it made a revocablc 
offer and revoked it before plaintiff communicated his accept-
ance to defendant. 
There is no evidence that defendant offered to make its bid 
irrevocable in exchange for plaintiff's use of its figures in 
computing his bid. Nor is there evidence that would warrant 
interpreting plaintiff's use of defendant's bid as the accept-
ance thereof, binding plainti1f, on condition he received the 
main contract, to award the subcontract to defendant. In sum, 
there was neither an option supported by consideration nor 
a bilateral contract binding on both parties. 
Plaintiff contends, however, that he relied to his detriment 
on defendant's offer and that defendant must therefore answer 
in damages for its refusal to perform. Thus the question is 
squarely presented: Did plaintiff's reliance make defendant's 
offer irrevocable' 
[1] Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts states: 
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial char-
acter on the part of the promisee and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise. " This rule applies in this 
state. (Edmo,~ds v. Oounty of Los Angeles, 40 Ca1.2d 642 
[255 P.2d 772] ; Prebank 00. v. Wh.ite, 152 Cal.App.2d 522 
[313 P.2d 633]; Wade v. Markwell & 00., 118 Cal.App.2d 
410 [258 P.2d 497,37 A.L.R.2d 1363] ; West v. Hunt Poods, 
Inc., 101 Cal.App.2d 597 [225 P.2d 978] ; Hunter v. Sparling, 
87 Cal.App.2d 711 [197 P.2d 807] ; see 18 Cal.Jur.2d 407-408; 
5 Stan. L. Rev. 783.) 
[2] Defendant's offer constituted a promise to perform on 
such conditions as were stated expressly or by implication 
therein or annexed thereto ,by operation of law. (See 1 
Williston, Contracts [3d -ed.], § 24A, p. 56, § 61, p. 196.) 
Defendant had reason to expect that if its bid proved the 
lowest it would be used by plaintiff. It induced "action ... 
of a definite and substantial character on the part of the 
promisee. " 
lIad defendant '8 bid exprellSly stated or clearly implied 
that it was revocable at any time before acceptance we 
would treat it accordingly. It was silent on revocation, how-
ever, and we must therefore determine whether there are 
414 DRENNAN tI. STAR PAVING CO. [51C.2d 
conditions to the right of revocation imposed by law or reason-
ably inferable in fact. In the analogous problem of an offer 
for a unilateral contract, the theory is now obsolete that 
the offer is revocable at any time before complete performance. 
Thus section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts provides: 
"If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part 
9f the consideration requested in the offer is given or ten-
dered by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound 
by a contract, the duty of immediate performance of which 
is conditional on the full consideration being given or 
tendered within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time 
is stated therein, within a reasonable time." In explanation, 
comment b states that the "main offer includes as a subsidiary 
promise, necessarily implied, that if part of the requested per-
formance is given, the offeror will not revoke his offer, and 
that if tender is made it will be accepted. Part performance 
or tender may thus furnish consideration for the subsidiary 
promise. Moreover, merely acting in justifiable reliance on 
an offer may in some cases serve as sufficient reason for making 
a promise binding (see § 90)." 
[3] Whether implied in fact or law, the subsidiary prom-
ise serves to preclude the injustice that would result if the 
offer could be revoked after the offeree had acted in detri-
mental reliance thereon. Reasonable reliance resulting in a 
foreseeable prejudicial change in position affords a compelling 
basis also for implying a subsidiary promise not to revoke an 
offer for a bilateral contract. 
[4] The absence of consideration is not fatal to the enforce-
ment of such a promise. It is true that in the case of unilateral 
contracts the Restatement finds consideration for the implied 
subsidiary promise in the part performance of the bargained-
for exchange, but its reference to section 90 makes clear that 
consideration for such a promise is not always necessary. The 
very purpose of section 90 is to make a promise binding even 
though there was no consideration "in the sense of something 
that is bargained for and given in exchange." (See 1 Corbin, 
Contracts 634 et seq.) Reasonable reliance serves to hold the 
offeror in lieu of the consideration ordinarily required to make 
the offer binding. In a case involving similar facts the Su-
preme Court of Sout.h Dakota stated that "we believe that 
reason and justice demaud that tIle dueirine [of seetion 90] Lc 
applied to the present fucts. We caunot believe that by accept-
ing this doctrine as eOlltrolling in the state of facts before us 
we will abolish the requirement of a consideration in contract 
) 
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eases, in any different SE'use than an ordinary estoppel abolishes 
some IE'gal requiremE'nt in its 8.pplieation. We are of the 
opinion, thereforc, tl1at thc ~cfcl1dants in E"xecuting the agree-
ment [which was not supported by consideration] made a 
promise whicl1 they should have reasonably expected would 
induce the plaintiff to submit a bid based thereon to the 
Governmt'l1t, t11at such promil'le did' induce this action, and 
that injustice can be avoided only by enforcE"ment of the 
promise." . (Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 69 
S.D. 397, 408 [10 N.W.2d 879] ; see also Robert Gordon, Inc. v. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654, 661; ct. JafllBS Baird Co. v. 
Gimbel Bros., 64 F .2d 344.) 
[6] When plaintiff used defendant's offer in computing l1is 
own bid, he bound himself to perform in reliance on defend-
ant's terms. Though defendant did not bargain for this use 
of its bid neither did defendant make it idly, indifferent to 
whether it would be used or not. On the contrary it is reason-
able to suppose that defendant submitted its bid to obtain 
the subcontract. It was bound to realize the substantial possi-
bility that its bid would be the lowest, and that it would be 
included by plaintiff in his bid. It was to its own interest 
that the contractor be awarded the gf'neral contract; the lower 
the subcontract bid, the lower the general contractor's bid was 
likely to be and the greater its chance of aceeptanee end lIenee 
the greater defendant's chance of getting the paving sub-
contract. Defendant had reason not only to expect plaintiff 
to rely on its bid but to want him to. Clearly defendant had 
a stake in plaintiff's reliance on its bid. Given this interest 
and the fact that plaintiff is bound by his own bid, it is only 
fair that plaintiff should have at least an opportunity to accept 
defendant's bid after the general contract has been awarded 
to him. 
[6] It bears notil1g that a general contractor is not free to 
delay acceptance after he has been awarded the general con-
tract in the hope of getting a .better price. Nor can he reopen 
bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same time claim 
a continuing right to accept the original offer. (See R. J. 
Daum Const. Co. v. Clu'l£l, 122 Utah 194 [247 P.2d 817, 823].) 
In the present case plaintiff promptly informed defendant that 
plaintiff was being awarded the job and that the subcontract 
was being a,,,,arded to defendant. 
Defendant contends, however, that its bid was the result 
of mistake and tllat it was therefore entitled to revoke it. It 
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relies on the rescission cases of M. F. Kemper Const. Co. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 37 Ca1.2d 696 [235 P.2d 7], and Brunzell 
Const. Co. v. G. J. Weisbrod, Inc., 134 Cal.App.2d 278 [285 
P.2d 989]. (See also Lemogc Electric v. San Mateo County, 
46 Ca1.2d 659, 662 [297 P.2d 638].) In those cases, however, 
the bidder's mistake was known or should have been to the 
offeree, and the offeree could be placed in status quo. [7] Of 
course, if plaintiff had reason to believe that defendant's bid 
was in error, he could not justifiably rely on it, and section 
90 would afford no basis for enforcing it. (Robert Gordon, 
Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654, 660.) Plaintiff, 
however, had no reason to know that defendant had made 
a mistake in submitting its bid, since there was usually a 
variance of 160 per cent between the highest and lowest bids 
for paving in the desert around Lancaster. He committed him-
self to performing the main contract in reliance on defendaut's 
figures. Under these circumstances defendant's mistake, far 
from relieving it of its obligation, constitutes an additional 
reason for enforcing it, for it misled plaintiff as to the cost of 
doing the paving. Even had it been clearly understood that 
defendant's offer was revocable until accepted, it wonld not 
necessarily follow that defendant had no duty to exercise 
reasonable care in preparing its bid. It presented its bid 
with knowledge of the substantial possibility that it would 
be used by plaintiff; it could foresee the harm that would en-
sue from an erroneous underestimate of the cost. Moreover, 
it was motivated by its own business interest. Whether or not 
these considerations alone would justify recovery for negli-
gence had the case been tried on that theory (see Biakanja v. 
Irving, 49 Ca1.2d 647, 650 [320 P.2d 16]), they are persuasive 
that defendant's mistake shonld not defeat recovery under 
the rule of section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts. 
[8] As between the subcontractor who made the bid and 
the general contractor who reasonably relied on it, the loss 
resulting from the mistake should fall on the party who 
caused it. 
Leo F. Piazza Paving Co. v. Bebek "" Brkich, 141 Cal.App. 
2d 226 [296 P.2d 368], and Bard v. Kent, 19 Ca1.2d 449 [122 
P.2d 8, 139], are not to the contrary. In the Piazza case the 
court sustained a finding that defendants intended, not to make 
a firm bid, but only to give the plaintiff "some kind of an 
idea to use" in making its bid; there was evidence that the 
defendants had told plaintiff they were unsure of the signifi-
cance of the specifications. There was thus no offer, promise, 
.. " ... ., 
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or representation on which the defendants should reaSOnably 
have expected the plaintiff to rely. The Bard case held that 
an option not supported by consideration was revoked by the 
• death of the optionor. The issue of recovery under the role 
of section 90 was not pleaded at the trial, and it does not 
uppear that the offeree's reliance was "of a definrtfe ·and 
substantial character" so that injustice could be avoided "'onI)' 
by the enforcement of the promise." 
[9] There is no merit in defendant'8 contention that 
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, on the ground that 
the complaint failed to allege that plaintiff attempted to miti-
gate the damages or that they could not have been mitigated. 
Plaintiff alleged that after defendant's default, "plaintiff had 
to procure the services of the L & H Co. to perform said 
asphaltic paving for the sum of $10,948.60." Plaintiff's uncon-
tradicted evidence showed that he spent several months trying 
to get bids from other subcontractors and that he took the 
lowest bid. Clearly he acted reasonably to mitigate damages. 
[10] In any event any uncertainty in plaintiff's allegation as 
to damages could have been raised by special demurrer. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 430, subd. 9.) It was not so raised and \Vas 
therefore waived. (Code Civ. Proc., § 434.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., Ind 
McComb, J., concurred. 
11 C.IIi-14 
